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ABSTRACT 
AMY VIRGINIA HALL: An Experiment on Pareto-efficiency and Communication in the 
Gale-Shapley School Choice Mechanism 
(Under the Direction of Dr. Mark Van Boening) 
 
The past few decades have seen an increase in the debate and discussion of school choice, 
and recent literature has focused on mechanism design approaches to satisfy that choice.  
The literature includes experimental studies of these mechanisms.  I conduct an 
experiment that examines the Gale-Shapley mechanism.  This mechanism considers the 
rankings by parents and students of their preferred schools as well as the schools’ 
priorities for students (based primarily on district or walk-zones) and uses a unique 
algorithm to produce student-school matchings.  My experimental design is based 
primarily on that of “Chinese College Admissions and School Choice Reforms: An 
Experimental Study” (Chen and Kesten, 2016).  I specifically attempt to answer a 
question raised in their findings about tacit coordination between participants to reach an 
unstable Pareto-efficient equilibrium.  I allow experienced subjects to communicate 
during the experiment via electronic chat.  I am interested in seeing if this communication 
can facilitate explicit coordination and consistently achieve this Pareto-efficient outcome.  
I find that experience combined with the chat feature do not seem to significantly affect 
participants’ ability to coordinate towards the Pareto-efficient outcome, and consistently 
reaching this outcome is difficult to facilitate.   
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I. Introduction 
I. A. Overview 
 
The past few decades have seen in increase in the debate and discussion of school 
choice, and recent literature has focused on mechanism design approaches to satisfy that 
choice (see, e.g., Chen and Sönmez (2006) and Ding and Schotter (2015)).  Various 
mechanisms have been designed to assign students to schools after parents rank their 
preferred schools and submit those rankings.  The matching and mechanism question is 
particularly interesting because of its real-life application in public policy as it relates to 
school choice policy.  The results of some of the experiments of matching games with 
these mechanisms have been used by policy makers to influence policy changes.  
 The literature primarily examines two assignment mechanisms: the Boston 
mechanism and the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance mechanism (Gale-Shapley).  My 
experiment will use the Gale-Shapley mechanism exclusively.  These mechanisms each 
consider the rankings by parents of their preferred schools as well as the school’s 
priorities for students (based primarily on district or walk-zones).  Each mechanism uses 
multiple rounds beginning with students and parents ranking their preferred schools.  The 
final allocations are produced after the last round.  The Boston mechanism is a sequential 
mechanism whereby placements made in each round are final after that round, and 
students who are assigned to a school during a round do not participate in future rounds.  
Placements under the Gale-Shapley mechanism are tentative each round, and no 
allocation is final until after the last round.  The primary question is which mechanism 
does a better job at maximizing total gains from placements. The ideal is the Pareto-
efficient, or first best, placement allocation that maximizes the entire group’s gain given 
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parents’ and students’ preferences and schools’ priorities.  The following explanation of 
each mechanism is taken verbatim from Chen and Sönmez (2006 p. 207, 208-209).  
I. B. Boston mechanism 
 
(1) For each school, a priority ordering of students is determined based on state 
and local laws/policies.  
(2) Each student submits a preference ranking of the schools.  
(3) The final phase is student assignment based on submitted preferences and 
priorities.  The outcome is obtained in several rounds.  
Round 1: In Round 1, only the first choices of the students are considered.  
For each school, consider the students who have it listed as their first choice 
and assign seats of the school to these students one at a time following their 
priority order until either there are no seats left or there is no student left who 
has listed it as her first choice.  
 In general, at  
 Round k: Consider the remaining students.  In Round k only the kth 
choices of students are considered.  For each school with available seats, 
consider the students who have listed it as their kth choice and assign the 
remaining seats to these students one at a time following their priority order 
until either there are no seats left or there is no student left who has listed it as 
her kth choice.  
I. C. Gale-Shapley mechanism  
 
(1) For each school, a priority ordering of students is determined based on state 
and local laws/policies.   
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(2) Each student submits a preference ranking of the schools.  
(3) The final and key phase is student assignment based on submitted preferences 
and priorities.  The outcome is obtained at the end of several steps.  
Step 1: Each student proposes to her first choice.  Each school rejects the 
lowest priority students in excess of its capacity and keeps the remaining 
students on hold.   
In general, at  
Step k: Each student who has been rejected in the previous step proposes 
to her next choice.  Each school considers the students it has been holding 
together with its new proposers; it rejects the lowest priority students in excess 
of its capacity and keeps the remaining students on hold.  
The algorithm terminates when no student is rejected and each student is 
assigned a seat at her final tentative assignment.  
I. D. Pareto-efficiency and Justified Envy 
 
 The Boston and Gale-Shapley mechanisms each have important theoretical 
properties. The Boston mechanism, though easier to explain to participants, has no 
dominant strategy, meaning that there is no strategy that is best in all situations regardless 
of the decisions of others.  Under the Boston mechanism, participants lose their priority at 
a given school if they do not rank it first (Abdulkadiroğlu & Sönmez, 2003).  Chen and 
Sönmez (2006) explain that misrepresenting their preferences by improving the rank of 
the school to which they have a high priority is sometimes in parents’ best interest.  This 
makes it difficult for parents and students to decide what they should do.  This lack of a 
dominant strategy results in an efficiency loss (final outcome relative to the first best 
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outcome from society’s point of view).  The Gale-Shapley mechanism, on the other hand, 
is more difficult to explain to participants, but because of its dominant strategy of truth 
telling, makes it easier for participants to understand what they should do.  In all 
situations, a participant cannot better his own outcome by using a strategy other than 
ranking his true preferences.  The Gale-Shapley mechanism also eliminates justified 
envy.  Justified envy is a complex concept that refers to the idea that while some school 
and participants might prefer other matchings than the final allocation, a switch cannot be 
justified from society’s point of view.  According to Chen and Sönmez (2006): 
A matching µ eliminates justified envy if there is no unmatched student–school 
pair (i, s) such that: 
• student i prefers school s to her assignment under µ and 
• student i has higher priority at school s than some other student who is 
assigned a seat at school s under µ.”  (206).  
Other mechanisms also eliminate justified envy, but the Gale-Shapley mechanism Pareto-
dominates all such mechanisms and empirically yields higher efficiency than the Boston 
mechanism, which does not eliminate justified envy. 
II. Literature Review 
 
 Many experiments have been conducted over the past decade to better understand 
these mechanisms and how they perform with different treatments.  The Boston 
mechanism and the Gale-Shapley mechanism have each been studied in recent years 
under different treatments that compare the relative performance of these mechanisms 
across environments.  Chen and Sönmez (2006) examine the two mechanisms in a 
random and designed environment that is meant to represent the real world.  They found 
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that because the Boston mechanism has no dominant strategy, participants misrepresent 
their preferences, and efficiency is lost.  The Gale-Shapley mechanism is more efficient 
because of its dominant strategy and high proportion of truth-telling under certain 
environments.  Chen and Sönmez (2006) also study a third mechanism (Top Trading 
Cycles mechanism), but because other scholars rarely study it, I have omitted it from my 
research.   
Ding and Schotter (2014) study the effects of allowing subjects to chat with one 
another as they participate in the experiment.  They use nine treatments varying not only 
the mechanisms and communication allowances, but also the intensity of the preference 
of the second-preferred school by lowering the payoff from 16 to 10 ECUs under the 
Boston mechanism.  They find that the impact of chatting differs by mechanism, intensity 
of preferences, and with whom the subjects chat.  Ding and Schotter (2014) only allowed 
up to 5 of the 20 subjects to chat so that they could avoid collusion between subjects.  
Because communication between different people in the school choice decision occurs, 
the performance of these mechanisms, when chat is allowed, is important for real-world 
applications.   
Chen et al. (2015) determine that an increased market size, i.e. number of students 
and school seats, still yields a stability advantage in the Gale-Shapley mechanism over 
the Boston mechanism.  Participant truth-telling increases under the Gale-Shapley 
mechanism, but decreases under the Boston mechanism when the market increases from 
4 students to 40 (and 1 slot at each school to 10).  A further increase in the market to 
4,000 students (and 1,000 slots at each school), however, has no effect on the 
performance of the mechanisms or on individual behaviors.   
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Ding and Schotter (2015) again examine the effect of a type of chat on the 
performance of these mechanisms, but specifically examine intergenerational advice.  
This type of chat requires subjects of one type to pass on advice after playing the game to 
subjects of the same type.  They use four treatments differing by mechanism, 
intergenerational advice, or repeatedly playing the game 20 times.  Ding and Schotter 
(2015) find that participant truth-telling decreases under the Gale-Shapley 
intergenerational advice treatment in the last five generations, even though truth-telling is 
the dominant strategy.  When subjects play repeatedly, however, the participant truth-
telling increases under the Gale-Shapley mechanism, meaning that the learning from the 
intergenerational and repeated playing is not the same.  The Boston mechanism produces 
similar results in both treatments of intergenerational advice and repeated games.   
Chen and Kesten (2016) use the same basic setup as Chen et al. (2015) including 
identical payoff structures, schools, and number of students.  Although they examine a 
four-school and six-school environment, I focus on the four-school and model my 
experiment after this.  They also examine a third mechanism, the Chinese parallel 
mechanism, which I have omitted.  Chen and Kesten (2016) find that participants are 
more truth-telling under the Gale-Shapley mechanism than the Boston.  They also find 
that the stable, but Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium is more common under the Gale-
Shapley mechanism than is the unstable, but Pareto-efficient Nash equilibrium.  
Interestingly, some participants seem to coordinate near the end of the experiment to 
reach the Pareto-efficient outcome more frequently.  This is somewhat surprising because 
the two participants who are primarily responsible for the increase in group earnings 
receive no increase in individual earnings, and thus have no individual incentive to 
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coordinate.  This finding is the primary motivation behind my experiment, and my 
communication treatment was designed to facilitate this coordination so as to reach the 
Pareto-efficient outcome more quickly and more frequently.  In Table 1, I provide a brief 
summary of some of the findings about the two mechanisms from previously conducted 
experiments.  
Table 1. Summary of Current Literature 
 Mechanism  
Citation Boston Gale-Shapley 
Chen and Sönmez (2006) No dominant strategy, 
preference 
misrepresentation, efficiency 
lost 
Dominant strategy, high 
truthful preference 
revelation, more efficient 
Ding and Schotter (2014) The results differ based on 
the intensity of the 
preferences. Participants 
under Boston 10 change 
strategy after chat more 
often than Boston 16 
 
40.83% of participants who 
chat with others change 
their strategy  
Chen et al. (2015) Justified envy, no 
mechanism effect on 
efficiency 
Less justified envy across 
all scales (4 to 4000), no 
mechanism effect on 
efficiency  
Ding and Schotter (2015) Efficiency is 87.4% in the 
intergenerational treatment 
and 86.67% in repeated 
treatment  
Efficiency approaches 
96.67% in the 
intergenerational treatment 
and 86.67% in the repeated 
treatment  
Chen and Kesten (2016) The Gale-Shapley 
mechanism is significantly 
more efficient than the 
Boston and is more likely to 
produce truthful rankings 
The stable, Pareto-
inefficient outcome is more 
common, but participants 
seem to coordinate to reach 
the unstable, Pareto-efficient 
outcome  
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III. Experimental Design 
III. A. Sessions and Protocol 
 
 I have modeled my experimental design on the Chen and Kesten (2016) 
experiment, however I only use the 4-school design and the Gale-Shapley mechanism.  
My primary interest is their finding regarding coordination between participants to reach 
the unstable Pareto-efficient Nash equilibrium in the latter part of their experiment.  I 
contacted Professor Chen to request her z-tree programs for the Boston and Gale-Shapley 
mechanisms to use for this experiment.  She provided me with the Boston mechanism 
and a file for the Gale-Shapley mechanism, which I was unable to open.  I worked with 
an Economics Ph.D. graduate student to recreate the Gale-Shapley z-tree program in 
order to run the experiment.  Obtaining the program and recreating it posed a difficult 
obstacle to overcome.  
Together with a second Economics Ph.D. graduate student, I recruited students to 
participate in the experiments by making announcements at several undergraduate classes 
and organization meetings as well as posting flyers in some parts of campus.  I used the 
SONA system to allow students to electronically register for economic games to earn 
cash for participation and their decision-making.  Attached as Appendix A is the script I 
used to recruit students.   
I ran four baseline sessions with four participants each between March 8 and 
March 23.  I then ran four treatment sessions from March 28 to April 11 with once-
experienced and twice-experienced subjects recruited from the baseline sessions. These 
eight sessions are summarized in Table 2.  Sessions with once-experienced subjects are 
denoted with an “x,” and sessions with twice-experienced subjects are denoted with “xx.”  
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Experienced subjects were divided into two cohorts, A and B, and they participated in the 
two treatment sessions as cohorts.  That is, Session 5x and Session 8xx used the exact 
same subjects, and Session 6x and Session 7xx used the exact same subjects.  
 
Table 2. Session Schedule  
Session Date Time  Average Earnings 
Baseline Sessions    
Session 1  Wednesday, March 8, 2017 1:00 PM $18.64 
Session 2 Thursday, March 9, 2017 11:00 AM $18.60 
Session 3 Wednesday, March 22, 2017 1:00 PM $18.53 
Session 4 Thursday, March 23, 2017 11:00 AM $18.64 
    
Treatment Sessions    
Treatment Cohort A    
Session 5x Tuesday, March 28, 2017 11:00 AM $24.86 
Session 8xx Tuesday, April 11, 2017 11:00 AM $24.68 
Treatment Cohort B    
Session 6x Wednesday, April 5, 2017 1:00 PM $25.55 
Session 7xx Friday, April 7, 2017 11:00 AM $25.10 
 
Each of the baseline sessions consisted of twenty rounds, and each of the 
treatment sessions consisted of thirty rounds.  The average payoff for subjects who 
participated in the baseline sessions was $18.60 across all four sessions.  For some 
sessions, extra participants were recruited in case of no-shows, and in such cases, I (the 
experimenter) asked for volunteers to opt out of participating in that session.  Those who 
did not participate were paid $5 for showing up, which is not factored into the average 
payoff of those who participated in the experiment.  Participants could earn up to $3.50 
for correct answers to the review questions at the end of the instructions in addition to 
their $5.00 show-up earnings.  The average payoff for treatment sessions was $25.05 
because treatment sessions consisted of thirty, rather than twenty rounds.  The total 
budget for the experiment was $731.50, and this funding was generously provided by the 
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Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College and the Trent Lott Leadership Institute at 
The University of Mississippi. 
At the beginning of each session, participants were given a set of written 
instructions (included in Appendix B) that were read allowed to them by the 
experimenter as they followed along.  After the allocation method and admissions 
process for the Gale-Shapley mechanism were explained, participants used their printed 
instructions to work out an example in which they determined a specific allocation using 
the Gale-Shapley admission method.  After entering their answers into the computer, they 
were asked ten more review questions about the instructions and how the mechanism 
would work.  Each correct answer earned the subject $0.25.  The z-tree program scored 
their answers and computed their quiz payoff.  The instructions and review questions 
generally took about 15-20 minutes.  Prior to the beginning of the first round, participants 
were randomly assigned a type (1, 2, 3, or 4) they remained that type throughout the 
session.  During a period, each participant ranked all four schools and submitted her 
ranking into the computer.  After all rankings in a group were submitted, the computer 
informed each participant of her school assignment and payoff for that round. 
Each session was finished in an hour or less.  Treatment sessions differed from 
baseline sessions by the implementation of a chat feature on the z-tree program.  The 
treatment sessions differed in the frequency and length of chat, and the details of these 
differences are explained in the session by session findings in Section VI. B. below.  
In Chen and Kesten (2016), the priority queue, or “lottery,” changed every five 
periods.  However, I used a simple priority queue (their lottery 1) for all rounds of all 
sessions.  My motive was to minimize changes during the course of a session and give 
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subjects a better chance at coordinating (tacitly in the baseline and explicitly in the 
treatment) on the unstable Pareto-efficient Nash equilibrium.  I used a fixed lottery of 1-
2-3-4 for all of my sessions.  I discuss the potential limitations of this lottery choice in the 
conclusion.  
III. B. Theory and Treatment 
 
I have designed my experiment to examine the effects of communication on the 
efficiency of the Gale-Shapley mechanism under a simple, four school choice model used 
in both Chen and Kesten (2016) and Chen et al. (2015).  In this environment, there are 
four students, i Î {1, 2, 3, 4} and four schools, s Î{A, B, C, D}.  Each school has one 
slot, which is allocated to one participant.  The choice environment is taken directly from 
Chen and Kesten (2016): 
We choose the parameters of this environment to satisfy several criteria: (1) no 
one lives in the district of her top or bottom choices; (2) the first choice 
accommodation index, i.e., the proportion of first choices an environment can 
accommodate, is 1/2; (3) there is a small number of Nash equilibrium outcomes, 
which reduces the complexity of the games.  (8). 
Students are represented by Type 1, 2, 3, or 4, and schools are represented by A, B, C or 
D.  Table 3 shows the payoffs for each student, and the brackets represent a student’s 
district school.  A student has higher priority in the bracketed district school than other 
applicants, and the district school is the second-choice school for each student.  Payoffs 
range from 16 points for a first-choice school to 5 points for a last-choice school.  
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Table 3. Payoff  
 School 
Type A B C D 
Payoff to Type 1 [11] 7 5 16 
Payoff to Type 2 5 [11] 7 16 
Payoff to Type 3 7 16 [11] 5 
Payoff to Type 4 5 16 7 [11] 
 
Borrowing again from Chen and Kesten (2016), the Gale-Shapley mechanism has 
a stable Nash equilibrium outcome where each student is assigned to her district school. 
 µC/S = 1"		2%		3'		4)  
The sum of the preference rankings in this Nash equilibrium is 8 and the sum of payoffs 
is 44.  The Gale-Shapley mechanism has another Nash equilibrium, µ*, which is Pareto-
efficient with a sum of preference ranks of 6 and payoff of 54.   
 µ* = 1"		4)		3'		2%  
According to Chen and Kesten, (2016):  
The Nash equilibrium profile that sustains outcome µ* is the following (asterisks 
are arbitrary): P1 = (A; *; *; *), P2 = (D; B; *; *), P3 = (C; *; *; *), and P4 = (B; 
D; *; *). This is an equilibrium profile regardless of the priority order.  Note that, 
in this equilibrium profile, types 1 and 3 misrepresent their first choices by 
reporting their district school as their first choices, while types 2 and 4 report their 
true top choices. (9).  
 In this Pareto-efficient outcome, participant types 2 and 4 receive their first choice 
schools and highest payoff of 16, while participant types 1 and 3 receive their district 
schools and payoff of 11.  The sum of the individual payoffs in the Pareto-efficient 
outcome is 54, while the sum of the payoffs in the stable Nash equilibrium outcome is 44.  
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 The µC/S equilibrium is stable and inefficient, while the µ* equilibrium is unstable 
and efficient.  The efficient equilibrium is unstable because it does not eliminate justified 
envy.  My analysis indicates that under the first lottery, types 1 and 3 prefer D and B 
respectively and have higher rankings at those schools than types 2 and 4, but they are 
assigned to their district schools.  Changing the lottery may affect which types have 
justified envy, but either type 1, 3, or both will have justified envy with this outcome.  As 
mentioned above, Chen and Kesten (2016) used four lottery queues.  A reduction in 
variation across lotteries is one reason I chose to use lottery 1 throughout all of my 
rounds of all of my sessions.  
 Between these two Nash equilibria, there are also some Pareto-improving 
outcomes that are not Nash equilibria.  I identify these in Table 4.  The efficiency for 
each outcome is the aggregate payoff as a percentage of the maximum (Pareto-efficient) 
payoff, 54.  There are four outcomes with higher efficiencies than the stable Nash 
equilibrium, but below the Pareto-efficient equilibrium.  They are listed as Pareto-
improvements and have efficiencies ranging from 83.3% to 92.6%. 
Table 4. Summary of Relevant Outcomes  
Outcome  Payoff  Efficiency  
Pareto-efficient Nash Equilibrium  54  100.0% 
Pareto-improvements  45, 46, 48, 50  83.3%, 85.2%, 88.9%, 92.6% 
Stable Nash Equilibrium   44  81.5% 
 
Chen and Kesten (2016) report a trend toward cooperation between types 1 and 3 in 
the last few rounds, and this coordination that leads to the Pareto-efficient equilibrium is 
the motivation behind my experiment.  Types 1 and 3 must coordinate by misrepresenting 
their preferences in the right way to reach the Pareto-efficient outcome, although they 
have no individual incentive to do so.  When types 2 and 4 engage in truth-telling, types 1 
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and 3 are indifferent between truth-telling and this specific misrepresentation.  My 
experiment seeks to create in environment in which this Pareto-efficient outcome can 
potentially be reached more quickly.  I implement two treatment aspects: experienced 
subjects who participate as cohorts and communication via electronic chat.  I am 
interested in finding out if the combination of these two aspects could increase the speed 
and frequency of reaching the unstable Pareto-efficient outcome.   
IV. Experimental Results 
 
 
 In examining the experimental results, I look at how often the Pareto-efficient, the 
Pareto-improving and the stable Nash equilibrium outcomes are reached.  I also analyze 
the per-period efficiency in each session.  In my four baseline sessions, each consisting of 
twenty periods, the Pareto-efficient outcome was only reached one time in one of the 
sessions.  
IV. A. Baseline Sessions 
 
I will first present the aggregate results from the baseline sessions and then present 
session by session efficiency data.  The round by round data used to generate the graphs 
for each of the baseline sessions is shown in Appendix C.  Table 5 shows a summary of 
the baseline sessions.  The aggregate average efficiency of the baseline sessions was 
81.30%, which is very close to the efficiency of the stable Nash equilibrium outcome 
efficiency of 81.5%.  The average total payoff had little variation across sessions ranging 
from 43.55 to 44.40.  The median total payoff was 44, the stable Nash equilibrium 
payoff, across all baseline sessions.  The unstable Pareto-efficient outcome was only 
reached in one period of one baseline session.  This occurred in Session 2, and the Pareto-
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efficient outcome was not reached in any other baseline session.  A total of 18 Pareto-
improving outcomes were reached across the 80 baseline periods, and the number of 
Pareto-improving outcomes in the individual sessions ranged from three to seven.  The 
stable Nash equilibrium outcome was reached in 63% of the baseline periods, ranging 
from 50-70% in individual sessions.  Arguably the most interesting thing is the one 
Pareto-efficient outcome found across all baseline sessions.  This is different from the 
Chen and Kesten (2016) finding.  I did not observe the same tacit coordination towards 
the Pareto-efficient Nash equilibrium near the end of the sessions.  
Table 5. Baseline Session Summary  
  Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4 All  
Average Efficiency 80.65% 82.22% 82.13% 80.19% 81.30% 
Average total payoff 43.55 44.40 44.35 44.30 44.15 
Median total payoff 44 44 44 44 44 
Pareto-efficient outcome  0 1 (5%) 0 0 1 (1%)  
Pareto-Improvements  4 (20%) 4 (20%) 3 (15%) 7 (35%) 18 (23%) 
Stable Nash Equil. Outcome  14 (70%) 14 (70%) 12 (60%) 10 (50%) 50 (63%) 
 
IV. A. 1. Baseline Session 1 
In the first baseline session, the stable Nash equilibrium was the most common 
outcome, occurring in fourteen of the twenty periods, and the unstable, Pareto-efficient 
Nash equilibrium outcome never occurred.  Outcomes that were Pareto-improvements 
over the stable Nash equilibrium were reached in four of the twenty periods.  The 
efficiency over the twenty periods is shown in Figure 1 below.   
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Figure 1: Baseline Session 1 Efficiency 
 
IV. A. 2. Baseline Session 2 
 
In Baseline Session 2, the stable Nash equilibrium was the outcome again in 
fourteen of the twenty rounds.  In period two of this session, however, the Pareto-
efficient outcome was produced, although it was never again hit in this session.  This was 
the only time across all of the baseline sessions that the Pareti-efficient outcome was 
reached, and it only occurred in one period.  Outcomes that were Pareto-improvements 
over the stable Nash equilibrium were reached in four of the twenty periods.  Figure 2 
below shows the efficiency of the twenty periods below.   
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Figure 2: Baseline Session 2 Efficiency. 
 
IV. A. 3. Baseline Session 3 
 
In Baseline Session 3, again the unstable Pareto-efficient outcome was never 
reached, but Pareto-improvements over the stable Nash equilibrium were reached in three 
of the twenty periods. Figure 3 below shows the efficiency of the twenty periods in 
Baseline Session 2.  
 
Figure 3: Baseline Session 3 Efficiency. 
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IV. A. 4. Baseline Session 4 
 
Baseline Session 4 produced seven Pareto-improvements over the stable Nash 
quilibrium outcome, but the Pareto-efficient outcome was never reached.  The Pareto-
improvements were only slight improvements, and outcomes producing less than the 
stable Nash equilibrium were reached in two periods.  Figure 4 below shows the 
efficiency of Baseline Session 4.  
 
Figure 4: Baseline Session 4 Efficiency. 
 
IV.  B. Treatment Sessions  
 
All of the treatment sessions used experienced subjects recruited from various 
baseline sessions, as discussed in Section III. A.  They were recruited as two cohorts, A 
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some degree of chatting via the computer, with the intent of providing subjects an 
opportunity to coordinate and potentially reach the Pareto-efficient outcome. 
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previously participated in Baseline Session 1.  The participants were taken through the 
instructions in the same manner as in the baseline experiment, and then a special 
announcement (Appendix D) was made telling them about their ability to chat between 
rounds with the other participants.  They played eleven rounds without chatting so that 
they could re-familiarize themselves with the game, especially in case they were assigned 
to a different type than in their previous session.  After the eleventh period, they had one 
minute to chat every five periods until round 30.   
The once-experienced subjects in this session hit the Pareto-efficient outcome two 
times before ever chatting with each other, but they did not hit it again after chatting.  
Participants reached the stable Nash equilibrium in 24 of the thirty rounds in this session.  
Participant 1 chatted with the other participants after period 21 saying, “Me and player 2 
need to alternate,” but they were never able to coordinate this alteration.  The chat did not 
seem to have much of an effect on the decisions made by participants.  Figure 5 below 
shows the efficiency of this session.  
 
Figure 5: Session 5x Efficiency. 
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 The same cohort came back for Session 8xx.  In this session, participants, who 
were now twice-experienced, were given a slightly abbreviated version of the instructions 
before receiving the special announcement (Appendix D) explaining that they would 
have one minute to chat in between every round from round seven to thirty.  This group 
never hit the Pareto-efficient outcome, and their chat provides at least a partial 
explanation as to why.  After period 15, participant 3 said, “so if we sacrifice every time 
we should get 16 every other time,” and after period 19 she said, “if we alternate we all 
won’t get as much points though.”  This shows a realization that alternating who gets a 
payoff of 16 is not a beneficial strategy for all of the participants.  This group hit the 
stable Nash equilibrium in twenty-seven of the thirty rounds and never a Pareto-
improving outcome over the stable Nash equilibrium.  Figure 6 shows the efficiency of 
Session 8xx below. 
 
Figure 6: Session 8xx Efficiency. 
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ranged from 79.94% to 82.35%.  The average total payoff hovered around 44, and 44 was 
the median payoff as in the baseline sessions.  The once experienced subjects hit the 
Pareto-efficient outcome twice, but the same cohort never hit the Pareto-efficient 
outcome in the next session.  This cohort reached Pareto-improvements in five periods of 
Session 5x, but did not reach any Pareto-improvements in Session 8xx.  Cohort A 
reached the stable Nash-equilibrium outcome in 80% and 90% of the periods in Session 
5x and Session 8xx respectively.  The round by round data used to generate the graphs 
for Treatment Cohort A is shown in Appendix E.  The average efficiency of the two 
sessions of Cohort A as well as the notable outcomes are shown in Table 6 below.   
Table 6. Cohort A Session Summary 
 Session 5x Session 8xx 
Average Efficiency 82.35% 79.94% 
Average total payoff 44.47 43.17 
Median total payoff 44 44 
Pareto-efficient outcome 2 (6.67%) 0 
Pareto-Improvements  5 (16.56%) 0 
Stable Nash Equil. Outcome  24 (80%) 27 (90%) 
 
IV. B. 2. Treatment Cohort B 
 
Treatment Cohort B was comprised of two participants from Session 3 and two 
participants from Session 4.  Because one minute of chatting every five rounds did not 
seem to sufficient for Session 5x, for Treatment Cohort B Session 6x, I allowed this new 
set of once-experienced participants to chat for three minutes after rounds 11, 16, 21 and 
26.  The chat, produced in full under Appendix G, shows that the participants agreed to 
switch off getting their first choice school.  Participant 3 suggested after period 11, “We 
could alternate so everyone gets 16 points 2 rounds.”  The efficiency from this data is the 
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most different of all the sessions as the Pareto-efficient outcome was reached nine times.  
Figure 7 below shows the efficiency of this session.  
 
Figure 7: Session 6x Efficiency. 
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Figure 8: Session 7xx Efficiency Data. 
 
The efficiency of the once-experienced Cohort B subjects in Session 6x was 
84.15%, while average efficiency for the twice-experienced subjects in Session 7xx 
decreased to 81.98%.  The difference between strategy and outcomes for this cohort 
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of experience seemed to have a negative effect on the efficiency of outcomes.  The 
participants reached the stable Nash equilibrium outcome in 53.33% of the rounds of 
Session 6x, which is much less than the 90% for Session 7xx.  Arguably the most drastic 
difference between these two sessions of Cohort B is the Pareto-efficient outcome, which 
was reached in nine rounds during Session 6x and was never reached in Session 7xx.  
Table 7 below shows the average efficiency for Cohort B’s two sessions and a summary 
of the notable outcomes for the sessions for Treatment Cohort B.  Cohort B had a 
decrease in efficiency and in frequency of reaching the Pareto-efficient outcome from 
Session 6x to Session 7xx.  
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Table 7. Cohort B Session Summary  
  Session 6x Session 7xx 
Average Efficiency  84.81% 81.98% 
Average total payoff 45.80 44.27 
Median total payoff 44 44 
Pareto-efficient outcome  9 (30%) 0 
Pareto-Improvements  10 (33.33%) 3 (10%) 
Stable Nash Equil. Outcome  16 (53.33%) 27  (90%) 
 
I should also note that it is arguably important to keep participants in the same role 
across sessions, although I did not control for this.  In a serendipitous meeting of one of 
the participants of Cohort B, I learned that because her role had changed from Session 6x 
to Session 7xx, she was less inclined to alternately earn payoffs of 16.  In session 6x, her 
earnings alternated between 11 and 16, but in Session 7xx, her earnings alternated 
between 16 and 7.  For whatever reason, she preferred the consistent payoff of 11 to 
alternating payoffs of 16 and 7 (average of 11.5).  The round by round data used to 
generate the graphs for Treatment Cohort B is shown in Appendix F.  
IV. B. 3. Summary of Treatment Results  
 
I implemented the chat feature and used experienced subject in order to facilitate the 
Pareto-efficient outcome.  The chat did not seem to have an effect on participants’ ability 
to coordinate towards the Pareto-efficient outcome.  After Session 6x, I expected Cohort 
B to continue their collusion and produce relatively efficient results, but instead they 
went the other direction and landed on the stable Nash Equilibrium.  Reaching the Pareto-
efficient outcome with a high degree of frequency seems to be difficult.  I was unable to 
replicate Chen and Kesten’s (2016) result in which a group of subjects were able to 
coordinate to reach the Pareto-efficient outcome consistently in the last few periods.   
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V. Conclusion  
V. A. Summary  
 
As more and more school districts look for ways to include an element of choice in 
the public school process, research into these different solutions is increasingly 
important.  Charter schools, vouchers, and choice mechanisms are all potential solutions 
that would incorporate choice into public school systems.  Research into these solutions 
has significant political implications and real-world applications, and research on choice 
mechanisms led to the Boston School District’s decision to adopt a deferred acceptance 
mechanism, like the one examined in this paper, to replace the Boston mechanism 
(Abdulkadirglu et al., 2006).   
The research examines several different choice mechanisms including the Boston, 
Gale-Shapley, Top Trading Cycles and Chinese parallel mechanisms.  My preliminary 
research focused primarily on the Boston and Gale-Shapley mechanisms, and because the 
Gale-Shapley mechanism is more efficient than the Boston, my experiments used the 
Gale-Shapley mechanism exclusively. 
Using the same parameters as the Chen and Kesten (2016) experiments, I tried to 
design an environment to facilitate the Pareto-efficient outcome by using experienced 
subjects and allowing them to chat with each other.  The baseline sessions trained a pool 
of subjects in the game, and produced an average efficiency level of 81.30% (with 
81.48% being the efficiency of the stable Nash equilibrium).  I saw no coordination 
towards the Pareto-efficient outcome at all in the baseline sessions, and the Pareto-
efficient outcome was only reached in one of the eighty baseline periods.   
I implemented a chat feature on experienced subjects to facilitate this coordination.  
Not only were subjects experienced with the game, but (especially in the twice-
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experienced sessions) they also had experience participating as a cohort.  The experience 
and chat feature did not seem to significantly affect participants’ ability to coordinate 
towards the Pareto-efficient outcome, and I was not able to replicate the findings of such 
coordination from Chen and Kesten (2016).  The Pareto-efficient outcome seems to be 
both theoretically and behaviorally unstable.   
It is important to note that in some of the sessions in which participants did reach the 
Pareto-efficient outcome, they did not do so in a way that suggested coordination 
between participants 1 and 3.  Participants found several other strategies for reaching this 
outcome other than coordination between 1 and 3, and the increased efficiency in the last 
periods of the experiment by Chen and Kesten (2016) could have occurred without such 
coordination.  The lottery I chose is also a factor in the different rankings, which produce 
the Pareto-efficient outcome, as I will explain under Section V. C.  
V.  B. Policy Theory Application 
 
 The results of this experiment, and Treatment Cohort B in particular, reflect a 
common theory of policy and decision making.  Kraft and Furlong (2013) suggest that 
incremental decision making is often substituted for the rational-comprehensive ideal 
approach.  According to rational decision making theory, people consider and evaluate all 
possible alternatives and solutions before choosing the alternative that maximizes 
potential benefits (Kraft and Furlong, 2013).  According to this decision process, 
Treatment Cohort B would have either continued with the alteration strategy or 
coordinated toward the Pareto-efficient outcome in Session 7xx.  Either strategy would 
have resulted in a higher payoff than the stable Nash equilibrium outcome.  Their 
decision to settle on the stable Nash Equilibrium strategy demonstrates an example of 
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incremental decision making.  Kraft and Furlong (2013) explain that incremental decision 
making is a more realistic approach when opposing interests are present.  This process is 
more limited and gradual, and it often results in compromise.  The decisions of Treatment 
Cohort B reflect real-world policy approaches that result in a suboptimal outcome due to 
partisan constraints and limitations of time and effort.  
V. C. Limitations  
 
 Chen and Kesten (2016) observed coordination between participants in the last 
few periods of their twenty-period sessions.  However, they had a rotating lottery, and 
this coordination was observed under their fourth lottery (i.e., priority queue) block.  
Arguably, I could have used this lottery block for my fixed lottery across all periods and 
sessions instead of the first lottery block that I did use.  Participants reached the Pareto-
efficient outcome using two ranking orders that would have produced the stable Nash 
equilibrium outcome only under lottery block 3, but the Pareto-efficient outcome under 
all three other lottery blocks.  Arguments could be made for either lottery block 3 or 4, 
but because of the time constraint and the difficulty that I had in obtaining a working z-
tree Gale-Shapley program, I chose to use the first lottery block.  I was also unaware of 
the importance of the block choice until I analyzed the microbehavior in my experiment.  
Further research could examine the effect of the lottery on the ability of certain rank 
order to produce the Pareto-efficient outcome.   
 Another limitation to this research is that I did not control for participants’ roles to 
remain constant across sessions.  Because the experienced subjects were recruited  from 
different baseline sessions, I could not ensure that they would have the same type number 
across sessions, but this could have reduced the likelihood of coordination.  As 
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mentioned in Section IV. B. 2, one participant was less inclined to alternate between 
earning 16 because of her knowledge from having been in a different role in a previous 
session.  Further research could control for the participant type across sessions.  
 In Session 7xx, participants decided against the strategy of alteration between 
high and low payoff for different participants because it was not more beneficial to all of 
the participants than receiving a consistent payoff of 11 would have been.  This is due at 
least in part to the design of the experiment and the weights assigned to each choice 
school.  Under a different experimental design or assigning different weights to other 
choice schools could have an impact on the coordination and strategy of participants.  
 Because Chen and Kesten (2016) suggested that the Pareto-efficient outcome 
required some level of coordination between all of the participants, I decided to let all 
four participants chat together.  Limiting the communication to certain groups within the 
session could have an affect on their ability to coordinate towards the Pareto-efficient 
outcome and make them less likely to choose a strategy of alteration between high payoff 
and low payoff.   
Further research into the school choice mechanisms is necessary to fully 
understand the incentives and behaviors that the mechanisms cause.  This mechanism 
directly affects the lives of people within certain school districts, and continued research 
can help ensure its success.  The school choice problem persists, and research into all 
potential solutions must progress.   
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Appendices  
 
Appendix A: Recruitment Script  
 
Hi my name is Amy Hall, and I am a senior Economics and Public Policy Leadership 
major here at the university.  As part of my senior thesis, I am doing research in the 
economics of decision-making and need volunteers.  
 
Why would you want to volunteer? Well, you can make a considerable amount of money.  
 
 How do you make money? Imagine a market game with buyers and sellers. Buyers want 
to buy at a price at or below value, sellers want to sell at or above costs, how much 
money they make depends on the decision at which they buy or sell. We have 
experiments with different games, but the concept is similar. You will play a 
computerized game in which your decisions and the decisions of others will jointly 
determine your earnings.  
 
How much money will you make?? Most people will make between $15 and 20.  
Everyone will get $5 just for showing up and honoring your time commitment.  It will 
only take an hour to an hour and a half of you time.  
 
You don’t need to know anything about Economics to play the game or to make money.  
We will go through the instructions of the game thoroughly and you will have a chance to 
make ask questions.  This game is not associated with any class, you will not be punished 
or rewarded by and professors by choosing to participate or not in this research. Most 
people find these games fun and interesting.  
 
The Research has been reviewed and approved by the IRB, so there is no risk to you for 
participating.  You can only make money, but not lose any.  
 
 
How can you participate? 
The game is computerized, and will take place in Conner 05.  You must be 18 years or 
older to play the game and you may sign up on SONA.  You may register at 
http://umsecon.sona-systems.com/, click “request an account” and then “Econ Games” on 
the dropdown menu.  Once you have signed up, you will receive an email with available 
dates and time to sign up to play the game. If you sign up for a time slot, it is imperative 
that you actually show up at that time, as the game cannot take place without the correct 
number of people.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
31 
Appendix B: Instructions for the Econ Game 
 
Instructions for Econ Game 
 
 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. In this experiment, we 
simulate a procedure to allocate students to schools. The procedure, payment rules, and 
student allocation method are described below. The amount of money you earn will 
depend upon the decisions you make and on the decisions other participants make. 
 
Do not communicate with each other during the experiment. If you have questions at any 
point during the experiment, raise your hand and the experimenter will help you. 
At the end of the instructions, you will be asked to provide answers to a series of review 
questions. Once everyone has finished the review questions, we will go through the 
answers together. 
 
Procedure 
• In this experiment, you are matched with 3 other participants who will make 
decisions under the same situation as yours. 
 
• Participants are classified into 4 different types, depending on their preferences 
over schools. Therefore, each group contains 1 of each of the four different types. 
Your type will be shown on your computer screen when the experiment starts. 
Your type remains the same throughout the experiment. 
 
• In this experiment, 4 schools are available for each group. Each school has 1slot. 
 
• Your payoff amount depends on the school you are assigned to at the end of each 
period. Payoff amount for 4 types of students are outlined in the following table. 
 
Table 1. Payoff Table 
 School 
Type A B C D 
Payoff to Type 1 [11] 7 5 16 
Payoff to Type 2 5 [11] 7 16 
Payoff to Type 3 7 16 [11] 5 
Payoff to Type 4 5 16 7 [11] 
 
• Your district school is in brackets. In other words, you reside in the bracketed 
school district. If a school is your district school, you have the higher priority than 
other non-district-school students at this school. 
 
• In this experiment, participants are defined as belonging to the following school 
districts: 
The district school for Type 1 students is school A; 
The district school for Type 2 students is school B; 
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The district school for Type 3 students is school C; 
The district school for Type 4 students is school D. 
 
• Your assigned school and your payoff have the following relation: 
If you are Type 1 student: 
You will be paid 11 points if you hold a slot of School A at the end of a period. 
You will be paid 7 points if you hold a slot of School B at the end of a period. 
You will be paid 5 points if you hold a slot of School C at the end of a period. 
You will be paid 16 points if you hold a slot of School D at the end of a period. 
The same goes for other types. 
 
• Just like you, other participants will also make the decision based on the above 
payoffs table and whether the school is district/non-district school. 
 
• The experiment consists of 20 periods. In each period, you are matched with 3 
other participants to form a group of 4; each group contains 1 of each of the four 
different types. Your earnings for each period depend on your choices as well as 
the choices of the 3 other participants you are matched with. 
 
• Every period, each participant will rank the schools.  Note that you need to rank 
all 4 schools in order to indicate your preferences. 
 
• After all participants have submitted their rankings, the server will start the school 
placement in each group and inform each person of his/her admitted school and 
respective payoff. Note that your allocation in each period is independent of your 
allocations in the previous periods. 
 
• Your total payoff equals the sum of your payoffs in all 20 periods. Your earnings 
are given in points. At the end of the experiment you will be paid based on the 
exchange rate: 
$1 = 20 points. 
In addition, you will be paid $5 for participation, and up to $3.5 for answering the 
Review Questions correctly. Everyone will be paid in private and you are under 
no obligation to tell others how much you earn. 
 
Admission Method 
 
• The priority order for each school depends on two factors: 
o Whether the student lives within the school district: the school will give 
higher priority to participants who live within the school district, and give 
low priority to participants who do not live within the school district. 
o Random lottery number: the server generated a random lottery number, 
and your lottery number is the same as your type number.  
• Again, the lottery number is used to break ties between non-district students 
applying to the same school, and the lottery is fixed for the twenty periods.   
• The process school admission is described by the following method: 
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Step 1: Each student applies to his first choice school. For each school, up to the number 
of applicants that does not exceed its capacity, who have the highest priority for this 
school, are tentatively accepted. The remaining applicants are rejected. 
 
Step 2: Each student rejected from a school at step 1 applies to his next favorite 
acceptable school. For each school, it pools together the new applicants and the students 
that have already been tentatively placed, and tentatively accepts those who have the 
highest priority within its capacity. The remaining applicants are rejected.  
 
The process continues until there is no student being rejected. Then all tentative 
acceptances become permanent. 
 
Note that the allocation is temporary in each step until the last step.  
 
An Example 
 
We will go through a simple example to illustrate how the allocation method 
works. This example has the same number of students and schools as the actual decisions 
you will make. You will be asked to work out the allocation of this example for Review 
Question 1. 
Feel free to refer to the experimental instructions before you answer any question. 
Each correct answer is worth 25 cents, and will be added to your total earnings. You can 
earn up to $3.5 for the Review Questions. In the experiment, the computer will 
automatically use this process, but this example is to ensure that you understand how the 
assignment allocation works.  
 
Students and Schools: In this example, there are four students, 1-4, and four schools, A, 
B, C and D. 
Student ID Number: 1; 2; 3; 4               Schools: A, B, C, D 
 
Slots and Residents: There is one slot at each school. Residents of districts are indicated 
in Table 3 below.  
 
 
 
Table 3. Residents Table 
School Slot District Residents 
A ☐ 1 
B  2 
C  3 
D  4 
 
Lottery: The lottery produces the following order. 
 
1 – 2 – 3 – 4  
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Submitted School Rankings: The students submit the following school rankings: 
 
Table 4: Submitted Rankings 
 Choices 
Students 1st Choice 2nd Choice 3rd Choice 4th Choice  
Student 1 D A C B 
Student 2 D A B C 
Student 3 A B C D 
Student 4 A D B C 
 
Priority: School priorities first depend on whether the school is a district school, and 
next on the lottery order: 
 Resident Non-resident 
Priority order at A 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 
Priority order at B 2 - 1 - 3 - 4 
Priority order at C 3 - 1 - 2 - 4 
Priority order at D 4 - 1 - 2 - 3 
 
The allocation method consists of the following steps: Please use this sheet to work out 
the allocation and enter it into the computer for Review Question #1. 
 
Step 1: Each student applies to his/her first choice. If a school receives more applications 
than its capacity, then it temporarily holds the applicant with the highest priority and 
rejects the remaining students.  
 
Student  School   Hold Reject 
3, 4 à A à   
  B    
  C    
1, 2 à D à   
 
 
Step 2: Each student rejected in Step 1 applies to his/her next choice. When a school 
receives new applications, these applications are considered together with the 
applications on hold for that school. Among the new applications and those on hold, the 
one with the highest priority is on hold within the school’s capacity, while the rest are 
rejected. 
 
Hold New Applicants   School   Hold Reject 
  à A à   
  à B à   
  à C à   
  à D à   
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Step 3: Each student rejected in Step 2 applies to his/her next choice. When a school 
receives new applications, these applications are considered together with the 
applications on hold for that school. Among the new applications and those on hold, the 
one with the highest priority is on hold within the school’s capacity, while the rest are 
rejected. 
 
Hold New Applicants   School   Hold Reject 
  à A à   
  à B à   
  à C à   
  à D à   
 
Step 4: Each student rejected in Step 3 applies to his/her next choice. When a school 
receives new applications, these applications are considered together with the 
applications on hold for that school. Among the new applications and those on hold, the 
one with the highest priority is on hold within the school’s capacity, while the rest are 
rejected. 
 
Hold New Applicants   School   Hold Reject 
  à A à   
  à B à   
  à C à   
  à D à   
 
Step 5: Each student rejected in Step 4 applies to his/her next choice. No one is 
rejected at this step. All students on hold are accepted. 
 
Hold New Applicants   School   Hold Reject 
  à A à   
  à B à   
  à C à   
  à D à   
 
 
The allocation ends at Step 5. 
 
• Please enter your answer to the computer for Review Question 1. 
 
• Afterwards, you will be asked to answer another 10 review questions. When 
everyone is finished with them, we will go through the answers together. 
 
• Feel free to refer to the experimental instructions before you answer any question.  
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Answer to Review Question 1:  
 
Step 1: Each student applies to his/her first choice.  
• Students 3 and 4 apply to school A, and students 1 and 2 apply to school D.  
 
• School A holds the application of student 3 and rejects student 4 because 3 has a 
smaller lottery number than 4, and neither of them are in the school district of A.  
 
• School D holds the application of student 1 and rejects the application of student 2 
because 1 has a smaller lottery number than 2, and neither are in the school 
district of D.  
 
Student  School   Hold Reject 
3, 4 à A à 3 4 
  B    
  C    
1, 2 à D à 1 2 
 
 
Step 2: Each student who was rejected in Step 1 now applies to his/her next choice.  
 
• Student 2 applies to school A and student 4 applies to school D.  
 
• School A considers the application of 2 together with the application of 3, which 
was on hold.  School A holds the application of student 2 and rejects the 
application of student 3 because 2 has a lower lottery number than 3, and neither 
of them are in the school district of A.  
 
• School D considers the application of 4 together with the application of 1.  School 
D holds the application of 4 and rejects 1 because 4 is in the school district of 
school D.  
 
Hold New Applicants   School   Hold Reject 
3 2 à A à 2 3 
   B    
   C    
1 4 à D à 4 1 
 
 
Step 3: Each student who was rejected in Step 2 now applies to his/her next choice.  
 
• Student 1 applies to school A and student 3 applies to school B.  
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• School A considers the application of 1 together with the application of 2, which 
was on hold.  School A holds the application of student 1 and rejects the 
application of student 2 because 1 is in the school district of A. 
 
• School B holds the application of student 3 because it has received no other 
applications.  
 
Hold New Applicants   School   Hold Reject 
2 1 à A à 1 2 
 3 à B à 3  
   C    
4  à D à 4  
 
 
Step 4: Each student who was rejected in Step 3 now applies to his/her next choice.  
 
• Student 2 applies to school B.  
 
• School B considers the application of 2 together with the application of 3, which 
was on hold.  School B holds the application of 2 and rejects the application of 
student 3 because student 2 is in the school district of B.   
 
Hold New Applicants   School   Hold Reject 
1  à A à 1  
3 2 à B à 2 3 
   C    
4  à D à 4  
 
Step 5: Each student who was rejected in Step 4 now applies to his/her next choice.  
 
• Student 3 applies to school C.  
 
• School C holds the application of student 3 because it has received no other 
applications.  
 
 
Hold New Applicants   School   Hold Reject 
1  à A à 1  
2  à B à 2  
 3 à C à 3  
4  à D à 4  
 
The allocation ends at Step 5.  
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Review Questions 2-11: 
2. How many participants are there in your group each period? 
3. True or false: You will be matched with the same three participants each period. 
4. True or false: Participant living in a school district has higher priority than any other 
applicants for that school. 
5. True or false: The priority for non-residents of a school district is determined by a 
lottery. 
6. True or false: The lottery is fixed for the entire 20 periods. 
7. True or false: A lottery number of 1 means that I have the highest priority among the 
other nonresident applicants in a school. 
8. True or false: Other things being equal, a low lottery number is better than a high 
lottery number. 
9. True or false: If you are held by a school of your choice, the schools ranked below are 
irrelevant. 
10. True or false: If you are not rejected at a step, then you are guaranteed to be placed in 
that school. 
11. True or false: The allocation is final at the end of each step. 
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Appendix D: Special Announcement 
 
Special Announcement 
 
For six periods, you will make decisions as described in the instructions and in your 
previous session. After that between every period, you will have the ability to chat via the 
computer with the other participants.  A chat window will open before each period 
beginning with period 1 and lasting until period 30, and you will have 1 minute to chat. 
You may discuss anything you like, but you may not make threats or arrange side 
payments outside of the experiment. The experimenter will be monitoring your 
conversation.   
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Appendix E: Treatment Cohort A Session Results  
 
Appendix Table E9. Treatment Cohort A Session 
Results  
  Session 5x  Session 8xx 
 Efficiency Earnings  Efficiency Earnings 
Period      
1 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
2 100.00% 54  81.48% 44 
3 100.00% 54  81.48% 44 
4 62.96% 34  81.48% 44 
5 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
6 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
7 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
8 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
9 81.48% 44  72.22% 39 
10 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
11 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
12 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
13 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
14 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
15 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
16 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
17 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
18 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
19 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
20 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
21 81.48% 44  62.96% 34 
22 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
23 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
24 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
25 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
26 83.33% 45  81.48% 44 
27 83.33% 45  81.48% 44 
28 81.48% 44  62.96% 34 
29 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
30 85.19% 46  81.48% 44 
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Appendix F: Treatment Cohort B Session Results  
 
Appendix Table F10. Treatment Cohort B Session 
Results 
  Session 6x  Session 7xx 
 Efficiency Earnings  Efficiency Earnings 
Period      
1 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
2 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
3 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
4 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
5 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
6 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
7 81.48% 44  83.33% 45 
8 81.48% 44  92.59% 50 
9 100.00% 54  83.33% 45 
10 100.00% 54  81.48% 44 
11 100.00% 54  81.48% 44 
12 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
13 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
14 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
15 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
16 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
17 100.00% 54  81.48% 44 
18 83.33% 45  81.48% 44 
19 100.00% 54  81.48% 44 
20 62.96% 34  81.48% 44 
21 62.96% 34  81.48% 44 
22 100.00% 54  81.48% 44 
23 62.96% 34  81.48% 44 
24 100.00% 54  81.48% 44 
25 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
26 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
27 100.00% 54  81.48% 44 
28 68.52% 37  81.48% 44 
29 100.00% 54  81.48% 44 
30 81.48% 44  81.48% 44 
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Appendix G: Session 5x Chat 
 
Period Chat Type 
11 hey what's up hello 4 
11 hi how did you rank 1 
11 Im lottery number 4  4 
11 I am 3 3 
11 im 2 2 
11 I am 1 1 
11 oh that makes sense lol \\ 3 
11 oh its our number for the player 2 
11 1 do you always get in your first priority school 4 
11 I am school C but I want to get into school B  3 
16 do yall put the same letters everytime 2 
16 So the person who is school B,do you always get in school B? 4 
16 yes except once i got in d 2 
16 yeah but theres no way to all get 16 points  1 
16 That school is the most points on mine  4 
16 B is the most on mine but I get C everytime bc that is my school  3 
16 so if we alternate putting it first we could both get more 16 2 
16 once I got in C  1 
16 palyer 2 yes 4 
21 did you get 16 2 
21 i put b first everytime 2 
21 yeah i put in the same numbers everytime  4 
21 no \\ 3 
21 no i got 11 every time 1 
21 Same 3 
21 me and player 2 need to alternate 1 
21 I get eleven also.  4 
21 and i did random numbers everytime  3 
21 ok which letters 2 
21 i just change between b and d 2 
21 being first and scond 2 
21 i usually put dabc 1 
26 I have put in my school last each time & still gotten it  3 
26 
So it really doesn't matter what we rank them if we want to get 16 if the 
person that is in that school sytem puts b first they automatically get into 
school b  4 
26 so put your school ranked way less 2 
26 I put B first 4 
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Appendix H: Session 8xx Chat 
 
Period chat Type 
7 HELP  1 
7 rt 2 
7 
my lottery number is 4 so I would have to be the only one trying to 
get into B to get in right? 4 
7 mines 3 but I try to get B cause its 16 pts 3 
7 If anyone besides me tries to get in B I wont 4 
7 mines 2 but i try to get d 2 
7 only the person in the school district B would get in? 4 
7 im in school district b 2 
7 yes I to want the D  1 
7 lol  1 
8 so the person in B do you always get in school B? 4 
8 i put b like third and still get it because im in district 2 
8 yes 2 
8 that's nice of you 4 
8 I put A last everytime & still get it  1 
8 but i want d so i put that where my loterry is which is 2 2 
8 
Im supposed to get in C every time and I do cause Im in the district 
but I want B 3 
8 I am in D and I alwys put it sefond  4 
9 im confused 2 
9 me too  1 
9 
i put cabd because i want b and put it where my lottery number is 
which is 3 but i still got c 3 
9 
So I don't see how this a way for anyone besides B to get in that 
school then? even the person with lottery number 1  4 
9 yeah i do DBCA every time  1 
9 I do BDAC every time  4 
9 and i want D but I get A  1 
9 I want B but i will never get it 4 
10 ha I got A last time bc  I changed my numbers up 4 
10 So someome else got D that time 4 
10 me too I got B  1 
10 whatd you change them to 3 
10 
we need to arrange our letters so nobody is putting the same number 
in the same place 2 
10 I got C again 3 
10 I did BACD 4 
10 agreed swap them up  4 
10 I did BACD as well??  1 
10 i got 16 points that time 2 
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10 ughhhhh 1 
10 i did DCBA 2 
10 I got 5 lol 4 
11 i did cdba 1 
11 still got a  1 
11 did bcda got c 3 
11 yea no matter how low i put b i can still get it 2 
11 same  1 
11 
And your lottery number is 1 so you would think you would get a 
higher number  4 
11 
my lottery number is 4 So i always get kicked out of anything 
besides D  4 
12 is there even a way to work this in our favor 3 
12 Everyone put your school last & lets see what happens  1 
12 I don't think so unless you are player 2 and are in school B  4 
12 even in the example abcd went with 1234 3 
12 okay  4 
12 there has to be a way to arrange it so everyone gets it but idk how' 2 
13 i got 16 that time 3 
13 DID EVERYONE PUT THEIR SCHOOL LAST?  1 
13 did everyone put their school last? 2 
13 yes  4 
13 I think 4 
13 I did 4 
13 sorry caps lol  1 
13 i got 7 that time 2 
13 shoot no 3 
13 I got A  4 
13 sorry  3 
13 I got 16 that time  1 
13 but i didnt put my school last and got 16 3 
13 how did two people get 16 4 
13 CONFUSED 4 
13 everyone put school last this time 2 
13 I got 5 so ya 4 
13 and see what happens 2 
13 B and D  1 
13 yea i got 7 hahah 2 
13 only two ppl can win each time  1 
14 ok not doing that again 2 
14 lol  1 
14 
when I put my school last I get 5 so yeah not doing that again sorry 
fam 4 
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14 i got 16 again only 2 people can win 3 
14 i get 7 2 
14 so nope 2 
14 i got 16 too woo  1 
14 so two people can get 16? 4 
14 I don't think so 4 
14 keep doing it!! sacrafice yourself  1 
14 just go back to how we used to be so we can all get 11 3 
14 lol nah  4 
14 wait we all get 11? 4 
14 I usually get 11 4 
15 got 11 that time 3 
15 I got 11 that time 4 
15 WHAT 4 
15 SAME  1 
15 got 11 yay 2 
15 confused af  4 
15 its only when people sacrifice themselves 3 
15 how do we all go to the same school 4 
15 I thouht we each got placed in one 4 
15 omg thats the point of the game!!  1 
15 so if we sacrifice every time we should get 16 every other time 3 
15 HA  AMY  1 
15 I guess  1 
15 Wait what is the point  4 
15 wait what 2 
15 explain 4 
15 to be nice?? idk  1 
15 how  4 
15 im confused now  3 
15 ^^ 2 
15 like I would give up my points so you could get 16 1 
16 i want to get 16 2 
16 I am in school D i put it second  4 
16 I always get D 4 
16 i always get C 3 
16 i want d 2 
16 player 2 are you in school B  4 
16 I always put my school last & still get it  1 
16 yes 2 
16 i always get b 2 
16 unless we do what we did last time i got 16 every time 3 
16 oh and it is 16 points? 4 
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16 yes d is 16 2 
16 B is 16 points? 4 
16 D for me is 11 4 
16 but b is 11 for me 2 
16 OH 4 
16 B is 16 for me I thou 4 
17 play 4 what is ur lottery  2 
17 so B is not 16  on erron'es computer  4 
17 for players 3 and 4 school B gets you 16 points 3 
17 mine is 2 2 
17 i am 4  4 
17 for players 1 and 2 school D is 16 points 3 
17 its like the example 3 
17 for players 4 and 1 B is 16? 4 
17 so player 1 where do u put d 2 
17 Oh 3 and 4 4 
17 B is 16 for me too 3 
17 bc 3 is a higher lotterly number you will get B 4 
17 makes sense 4 
18 like ill get 16 over  player 4 cause im lottery 3 3 
18 
So two of us are trying to get in the same school and the othe two 
are  4 
18 if player 1 puts d 2nd and i put it first we both get 16? 2 
18 I thought all 4 of us were trying to get in the same 4 schools 4 
18 maybe? 4 
18 
both 3 and 4 want both 1 and 2 want D there can only be two 
winners each time if we do it right-  1 
18 
yeah but 2 of us are trying to get in the one w 16 and the other 2 are 
trying to get to the other one w 16 3 
18 Oh gotcha. so two of the four win 4 
18 so we need to alternate 2 
18 exactly 3 
19 I put B first but I never get it 4 
19 if we alternate we all wont get as much points though 3 
19 do i put d as my lottery numebr or not 2 
19 So player three do you get B every time? 4 
19 no I get C every time but I want B 3 
19 so who gets B every time? 4 
19 2 1 
19 me 2 
19 geesh 4 
19 confusing 2 
20 who puts d high on their list 2 
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20 i dont see how we all win  1 
20 me 1 
20 we cant all win 3 
20 which number? 2 
20 I don't think we can 4 
20 I put it at the top each time but it never works 1 
20 only 2 out of the 4 of us can win 3 
20 supply and demand says we don't 4 
20 and u have lottery 1? 2 
21 i put d 2nd everytime so idk 2 
21 I put d second everytime too 4 
21 i put d last 3 
21 thats my lottery  2 
21 I get kicked out of B then get D bc that is my district 4 
21 it doesnt matter if you put it in your lottery number i dont think 3 
21 I put my school last each time & I still get it  1 
22 igot 7  1 
22 i got 5 that time 2 
22 sry guys lol we back tho!!! 3 
22 i got 11 3 
22 i got 11 too 4 
22 how did no one get 16  3 
22 that's crazy 4 
22 I put it first 4 
22 so did i 3 
22 i am so confused  1 
22 this is broken 4 
22 i put it last 2 
22 that means that player 2 didnt get in their distrcit 3 
22 nope :( 2 
22 yeah Amy just give us all $100 1 
22 then why didnt someon elese 4 
23 i got 11 2 
23 got 11 1 
23 got 11 3 
23 
If this is how is really works to get in school then i am 
homeschooling my kids 4 
23 i got 11 4 
23 omg this is weird 2 
23 
if player 2 didnt get in their district last time but i didnt get 16 then 
idk 3 
23 I am confused  4 
23 cause i put it first 3 
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23 yea idk bc i didnt 2 
23 and player 4 didnt get 16 either 3 
23 i put 16 first and stil don't get in how b not accept anyone 4 
23 B is rude  4 
23 so like technically cause 3 is lower than 4 i shouldve gotten b 3 
23 must be a private school 4 
24 got 11 3 
24 I got 11 4 
24 i never get d 2 
24 11 1 
24 i got 11 2 
24  how do we all get 11!! what school is 11 for yall 4 
24 well at least we get 8.50 for sure 3 
24 Well lets just all get 11 and call it a day  1 
24 I got in school D which is 11 points  4 
24 1234 matches with abcd 3 
24 i get in B which is 11 2 
24 B on my screen is 16  4 
24 B is 16 for player 3 and 4 3 
24 yeah we just match with our schools each time  1 
25 so all of yall are in a disttrict that is 11 points 4 
25 b is 16 for players 3 and 4  3 
25 i keep changing my order & i still get 11  1 
25 d is 16 for players 1 and 2 3 
25 like the one you are assigned is 11 points? 4 
25 yes 2 
25 everyones is  1 
25 
abcd matches with 1234 each of us gets 11 points if we all match w 
those 3 
25 OH 4 
25 I thought someone was assigned to the school with 16 4 
25 lets unmatch maybe? 2 
25 no lol  1 
25 no!! 3 
25 to ger 16 2 
25 hahahaha  4 
26 So everyone is just getting 11 now? 4 
26 yep  1 
26 yep 2 
26 is it possible to put b in all of them lol 3 
26 We are all getting in our school 4 
26 no I tried that 4 
26 but i put my school far down on the list 2 
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26 I wil put C first & see what happens  1 
26 amy teach us we dont get it 3 
26 I put D second  4 
26 if i don't i get a lower number  4 
27 i still got 11 2 
27 same  1 
27 usually I get 16 once or twice but not today 4 
27 yall smart 4 
27 same 2 
27 If I put D last I get A 4 
27 i put D last but get C 3 
27 i guess bc your lotteryis so low 1 
28 still getting 11 4 
28 aint mad tho 4 
28 same  1 
28 I heard school B had rad Unis 4 
28 its true 2 
28 thats why i want them  :( 3 
28 I don't think there is a way for me to get in 16 4 
28 i go there obvi since i get it every time hahah 2 
28 well A sucks let me tell you  1 
28 my school is public 3 
28 I don't know how I did last time 4 
28 food is crap  1 
29 I GOT 7  1 
29 who got 16?? 2 
29 So player 3 you are trying to get in school B 4 
29 because i got 5 2 
29 
when u get all dgs to do an experiment together this is what happens 
hahaha 3 
29 i got 11 3 
29 are you trying to get in school b player 3 4 
29 yes 3 
29 but i never do :( 3 
29 if neither one of us gets in school b then who does 4 
29 me  2 
29 Well i got in it that time & i dont even want in it!  1 
29 player 2 usually but this time no one did 3 
29 but you said it is worth 11 points 4 
29 but i put it low 2 
29 on ours it is 16 4 
30 got 11 3 
30 same 2 
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30 is it the same school B then? 4 
30 For me B is only 7  1 
30 if they are differnt numers  4 
30 plot twist ont eh last answer we all get 16 2 
30 but i got 11 that time 1 
30 on the 2 
30 c is 11 b is 16 a is 7 d is 5 for me 3 
30 wow i cant type 2 
30 
so then player 3 and 4 are trying to get in completely different 
schools than 1 and 2? 4 
30 yes 1 
30 a is 5 for me so our numbers vary too players 3  4 
30 yes but it still effects yall 2 
30 
yeah but schools 1 and 2 steal ours from us cause yalls lottery 
numbers 3 
30 because we have higher lottery 2 
30 oh I see 4 
 
 
Appendix I: Session 6x Chat 
 
Period chat Type 
11 Any thoughts on how to get the 16 payout 1 
11 we could all get 16 points for two rounds  3 
11 but when two get 16 points the other will have to get 5 or 7 3 
11 we could alternate so everyone get 16 points 2 rounds 3 
11 if 1 chose A, 2 chose D, 3 chose C, 4 chose B 3 
16 did anyone get the 16 3 
16 Yes I think like once 4 
16 
i did for 3 rounds in a row but two of the rounds were 9 and 10 
before the chat\\ 2 
16 I have only gotten 11 every time 1 
16 
this time 1 pick D, 2 pick C, 3 pick B, and 4 pick A, and then we 
can alternate. 3 
16 the next round 1 pick A, 2 pick D, 3 pick C, and 4 pick B 3 
16 I pretty much get  11 everytime 4 
16 i picked c for two rounds last time and still ended up with 11 2 
16 Yeah ive gotten 11 everytime 3 
16 it would work if everyone actually picked thouse 2 
16 those 2 
16 
I think if we try picking those we will get 16. but we have to 
alternate 3 
16 write it down and we can alternate each time 3 
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16 alternate every other round? 2 
16 yeah so not the same people get 16 every round 3 
16 i'm good with that 2 
16 for the next round lets start with 1 picking D 3 
16 and then go to the next list for the next one 3 
21 did everyone get 16 3 
21 yes 2 
21 Yes  4 
21 same. lets keep doing this 3 
21 agreed 2 
21 Okay 4 
21 yes 1 
21 where should we start this time 3 
21 I dont remember where we left off 3 
21 start off the same way this time? 1 D, 2 C, 3 B, 4 A 2 
21 okay! 3 
21 then 1 A, 2 D, 3 C, 4 B  2 
26 it didnt work for me this time 3 
26 it worked for me 2 
26 I got 16 once 4 
26 i got 5 on the first one 1 
26 yeah i got 7 most of the time 3 
26 i've gotten 7 a couple times 2 
26 but also 16 a couple times 2 
26 I got mostly 11 4 
26 
i didnt get 16 at all this time but if we keep doing that list it 
should work 3 
26 
i would get 11 sometimes even when i ranked my district school 
3rd 2 
26 but i agree let's keep doing the list because it's worked before 2 
26 
but I think if it is your district school you have to put it like 3rd 
when trying to get 16 3 
26 start off same as last time? 2 
26 lets start with 1D 2C 3B and 4D 3 
26 i mean 4 A 3 
26 sounds good 2 
 
Appendix J: Session 7x Chat  
 
Period chat Type 
7 What was the order? 1 
7 1D 2A 3B 4C 4 
  
53 
9 has it been working 4 
9 yes 2 
9  it didnt work for me 4 
9 I have gotten 11 everytime 1 
9 but 1D 2A 3B 4C 4 
11 i get 11 everytime 4 
11 same 1 
11 Same 3 
12 should we try something else 4 
12 or just stick with 11 4 
12 
if we switch back and forth between getting 16 and 7 we really aren't 
gaining much more than we would if we just did 11 2 
 
 
 
